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STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION-1960 TENNESSEE SURVEY
PAUL J. HARTMAN*

I.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE-CONGRESSIONAL CURBS ON STATE POWER
NET INCOME FROM MULTISTATE OPERATIONS

To

TAX

II. USE TAXES-PROPOSED CONGRESSIONAL CURBS ON USE TAX COLLECTIONS BY
OUT-OF-STATE SELLERS

III. INTERSTATE COMMERCE-SIGNIFICANCE OF STATUTORY FORMULA IN DETERMINING CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRIVILEGE TAX ON INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF GAS
IV. PRIVILEGE TAXES-VENDING MACHINE OPERATIONS-LIABILITY OF TRANSFEREE
FOR UNPAID PRIVILEGE TAXES OF TRANSFEROR

A. Effect of Proration
B. Statutory Meaning of "Transferee"
C. Problem of Double Taxation
V. MUNICIPAL FRANCHISE TAXES-STEPS NECESSARY To RECOVER AN ILLEGAL TAX

Only a few Tennessee cases involving state and local taxes have
been decided during the period covered by this survey. However,
action in the halls of Congress has had a tremendous impact on the

taxing power of all state and local governments.
I. INTERSTATE COMMERCE-CONGRESSIONAL

CURBS ON STATE POWER
TAX NET INCOME FROM MULTISTATE OPERATIONS

To

A congressional statute that became law on September 14, 1959,

severely curtails the power of all state and local governments to impose net income taxes. This statute was the aftermath of the Northwestern-Stockham' decision, and a series of cases soon to follow, 2 by
the United States Supreme Court, which held that neither the due
process nor the commerce clause bars the way to a nondiscriminatory,
properly apportioned state tax levied directly on net income derived
exclusively from interstate commerce. These decisions by the Supreme Court caused such a furor in the business world that demands
were soon made on Congress for protection against the suddenly publicized danger of future, as well as retroactive taxes. It was feared
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. Member, Tennessee bar.
1. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450
(1959). Elsewhere the writer has considered in detail this case, along with
the case in note 2, infra, as well as this congressional statute. See Hartman,
State Taxation of Corporate Income from a Multistate Business, 13 VAND.
L. REV. 21, 23-48 (1959).

2. International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot, 236 La. 279, 107 So. 2d 640, cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector of

Revenue, 234 La. 651, 101 So. 2d 70 (1958), appeal dismissed and cert. denied,

359 U.S. 28 (1959); ET & WNC Transp. Co. v. Currie, 248 N.C. 560, 104 S.E.2d

403, aff'd per curiam, 359 U.S. 28 (1959).
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that not only would the states widen their tax-gathering net in the
future, but also collect any possible back taxes.
3
Congress soon responded to pressures by enacting Pub. L. 86-272,
which permits a company or person to go or send a representative
into another state to solicit orders for the sale of tangible personal
property without paying a state or local net income tax to the state
of solicitation. This congressional enactment prohibits net income
taxes whether imposed on, or measured by, net income. The statute
does not outlaw a tax on net income from the sale of anything except
tangible personal property. Moreover, Congress has not immunized
this income from taxation unless the only contact of the seller with
the taxing state is that of solicitation of orders. Also, the avenue of
escape from the income tax is not open unless the extra-state seller
makes certain that all the solicited sales are finally approved at, and
the goods shipped from, some point outside the state of solicitation.
The out-of-state seller can still retain his passport to tax immunity if
he sells through an independent contractor, 4 who can maintain his
own offices within the customer's state and accept orders there.
Troublesome questions almost certainly will arise as to whether the
particular in-state dealer actually is an independent contractor, or
simply a "dummy" set up to evade tax consequences on the part of
the extra-state seller.
This congressional curb on state taxing power does not exempt
from the net income tax a taxpayer providing a service. Consequently, the Currie5 case, in which the United States Supreme Court
lately upheld a net income tax assessed against a motor carrier engaged exclusively in interstate transportation, apparently remains the
law, because solicitation of freight and passenger business would not
fall within the purview of the tax immunity given by Congress. Apparently, therefore, there would be no tax relief in this new statute
from an otherwise valid tax on net income for trucking companies,
taxicabs, railroads, pipelines, newspapers, radio and television stations, telephone and telegraph companies, water transportation and
insurance.6 The commodities they sell are not tangible personal
property.
Another vexatious point that almost certainly will arise under this
3. 73 Stat. 555 (1959), 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-84 (Supp. 1959).
4.73 Stat. 555 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 381(c)-(d) (Supp. 1959).
5. ET & WNC Transp. Co. v. Currie, 248 N.C. 560 104 S.E.2d 403, aff'd per

curiam, 359 US. 28 (1959).
6. See Senate Comm. on Finance, State Taxation of Income Derived from

Interstate Commerce, S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1959) (minority
views of Senators Albert Gore and Eugene J. McCarthy). The states, of
course, have been given power to tax and regulate interstate insurance
operations by the McCarran Act, 59 Stat. 34 (1945), 15 U.S.C. 1012(a) (1958).
That act was sustained, over a commerce clause attack in Prudential Ins.
Co. of America v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
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congressional restraint on" state and local taxing power will be the
determination of whether the item sold is tangible personal property,
the income from the sale of which may be free from taxation. The
statute itself makes no attempt to define "tangible personal property."
There are bound to be borderline cases. What about fabrication and
installation; when will they be regarded as taxable activity? If an
interstate sales contract, which is otherwise exempt under the statute
from the income tax, includes a provision for some future servicing
such as installation, consultation, or repairs, does that constitute a
sufficient nexus to entitle the purchaser's state to impose an income
tax on the entire transaction? Also, by whose law will the courts
determine whether the property sold is tangible personal property?
Will it characterize as a matter of federal law the nature of the property involved, so as to insure uniformity of interpretation and-enforcement, or will it treat this as a matter to be determined by the
divergent laws of the fifty states?
Since the congressional restraint on the power of the states to
impose net income taxes is limited to the situation where the out-ofstate seller engages only in the business activities of "solicitation" of
orders within the state, there necessarily will arise questions concerning the meaning of "solicitation." Is the tax-immune activity of solicitation limited to the taking of orders, or can the seller engage in
aggressive and extensive sales promotional activities within the state
and still escape the net income tax on the ground that he is merely
engaging in solicitation of orders?
The congressional restriction on state taxing power has no application to the imposition of a net income tax by any state or political
subdivision thereof where the seller is a domestic corporation of the
taxing state, or an individual domiciled in, or a resident of, the taxing
state.7 Only the out-of-state seller has an avenue for escaping the
net income tax. The shorn local lamb must still feel the cutting sting
of the severe tax wind.
Two additional provisions of this congressional statute should be
noted. It has a retroactive application to the effect that if the states
or local governments have not assessed income taxes, which are prohibited by this law after the date of enactment, then the taxing
authorities cannot go back and assess taxes for income from sales
made in the past.8 Also, the House Judiciary Committee and the
Senate Finance Committee are required to make full and complete
studies of state taxation of income derived from interstate commerce,
for the purpose of proposing "legislation providing uniform standards
7. 73 Stat. 555, § 101(b) (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 381(b) (Supp. 1959).
8. 73 Stat. 556, § 102 (1959), 15 U.S.C. 382 (Supp. 1959).
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to be observed by the States in imposing income taxes on income"
from interstate commerce. The committees are required by the act
to report to their respective Houses the results of such studies not
later than July 1, 1962.10
This congressional curtailment of state power to tax net income
has been vigorously criticized." Such action by Congress has been
declared to be an invasion of the powers of the state, which they
now have for raising necessary revenue, without which they must
become powerless wards of the national government. Also, such
restrictions are thought to discriminate against many small local
businesses, which must compete with large multistate operators who
can escape a large share of state income taxes by conducting many
of their interstate operations by solicitation only. Moreover, these
congressional restraints have been characterized as nothing more
than a protective measure for a few manufacturing states and a few
companies which do a multistate business of a specified type.

II. USE TAXES-PROPOSED CONGRESSIONAL CURBS ON USE TAX
COLLECTIONS BY OUT-OF-STATE SELLERS

Bills have been dropped into the hoppers of both houses of Congress to prohibit states from requiring an out-of-state seller to collect
a use tax under certain circumstances. These bills would forbid a
state to require an out-of-state seller to collect its use tax where
seller's only contact with the taxing state is that he has solicited the
sale in the state. 12 By thus making solicitation only an insufficient
nexus to require collection of a use tax, these proposals follow the
same pattern as that used by Congress in restricting the power of the
13
states to impose net income taxes.
This proposed congressional limitation on use tax collection techniques resulted, in part, from a recent decision by the Supreme Court
of the United States. In the Scripto case 14 the Court held that an
out-of-state seller who sells goods through an independent contractor
in a state imposing a use tax can be required to collect the use tax.
There the Court held that the taxing state (Florida) could require
the foreign retailer soliciting sales in the taxing state through
independent wholesalers and jobbers to collect its use tax without
9. 73 Stat. 556, § 201 (1959).
10. 73 Stat. 556, § 202 (1959).

11. See Senate Comm. on Finance, op. cit. supra note 6, at 10-12; Cox,
The Impact of Recent Supreme Court Decisions on State Taxation of

Interstate Commerce, in
(1959).

NATIONAL

TAX AsSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS 441, 442-43

12. H.R. 12, 235 and S. 3549, 86th Cong. 2d Sess. (1960).
13. Pub. L. 86-272, discussed earlier, beginning at note 3 supra.
14. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
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violating either the commerce or the due process clause of the federal
constitution.
The General Trading case 15 had earlier held that an extra-state
seller could be required to collect a use tax where the seller had, by
means of salesmen, made sales in the state imposing the use tax.
Scripto, by holding that selling through independent contractors is
a sufficient nexus to require the collection of the tax, thus extended
one step further the use tax collecting device where the use tax is
levied on goods sold from an out-of-state source. Scripto expressly
left untarnished, however, Miller Brothers,16 which held that the due
process clause was violated where the taxing state sought to make an
out-of-state seller collect its use tax, where the seller had approached
the market by newspaper and radio advertising, the mailing of circulars and deliveries of purchases into the taxing state.
The proposed congressional ban on use tax collections, where the
contact of the foreign seller is only that of solicitation, has not yet
become law.
The device by which the out-of-state seller is required to collect
a use tax is of considerable importance in the fiscal affairs of many
of the states. 17 The residents of a state which has a sales tax likely
will confine most of their minor purchases to local sources, even
though they must pay the sales tax. They are apt, however, to go
bargain hunting outside the state for their major purchases in order
to escape the sales tax. The unfortunate victim of such extra-state
bargain hunting is not merely the state whose coffers are shortchanged, but the local merchant whose transactions are subject to the
local sales tax and who find themselves at a competitive disadvantage with the foreign seller whose sales are subject to no
sales tax. This hole in the economic dyke has, in part, been plugged
by the purchaser's state by means of the compensating use tax,
which is a levy on the privilege of using within the taxing state
property purchased outside the state, if the property would have been
subject to a sales tax had it been purchased within the state. A
convenient administrative device employed by the taxing state has
been the requirement in the use tax statute that the out-of-state
seller serve as a use tax collector. The use tax thus helps the retail
sellers in the taxing state to compete upon terms of equality with
retail dealers in other states who are not bothered with a sales tax.
Also, the use tax, as thus administered, avoids the likelihood of a
drain upon the revenue of the taxing state by removing from buyers
15. General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1914).
16. Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
17. Some thirty-four states, some cities and the District of Columbia
now require foreign sellers to collect the use tax. See Use Tax on Interstate
Sales, 21 CCH STArE TAx REv. No. 14, pp. 25-46 (Extra ed., April 8, 1960).
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the temptation to place their"orders in other states in order to escape
payment of the local sales tax.18
III. INTERSTATE COMMERCE-SIGNIFICANCE OF STATUTORY FORMULA IN
DETERMINING CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRIVILEGE TAX ON INTERSTATE
TRANSPORTATION OF GAS
The decision by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Texas Gas Transmission Corporation v. Atkins 19 presents the recurring and vexatious
problem of the extent to which a state should be permitted to go in
requiring interstate commerce to pay its way. With state governments, in the overall picture, apparently operating "in the red, ' 20
the states have understandably persisted in their efforts to reap
some revenue return for the benefits they have conferred upon all
business within their borders, whether it be local or interstate operations. It is of vital importance, of course, that the commerce and
trade of our nation not be hobbled with the state taxes that will
prevent a dynamic, expanding economy.
The tax that was questioned in the Texas Gas case was a franchise
tax imposed on all business organizations as a recompense for the
protection of local activities of each business and as compensation
for the benefits such business receives from doing business in Tennessee. 21 Taxpayer, a foreign corporation not domesticated in Tennessee, was engaged in transporting gas. It maintained in Tennessee
four-hundred five miles of pipe line, along with two compressor
stations and workmen to service the line, plus a staff of administrative
personnel, and it had obtained numerous highway permits. However,
all of taxpayer's property and personnel were employed exclusively
in furtherance of its business of transporting gas solely in interstate
commerce.
Taxpayer launched a two-pronged assault on the validity of the
tax. Since the statute levied the tax as a recompense for the protection of "local activities," it was urged that the tax did not apply
to taxpayer, who was engaged exclusively in interstate commerce. In
the second place, taxpayer contended that the tax was offensive to the
18. These purposes and consequences of the compensating use tax are
frankly recognized by the Court, but they did not militate against the
constitutionality of the tax. See Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S.
359, 363 (1941); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 581 (1937). The
writer has discussed more fully the use tax in another connection. See
Hartman, Sales Taxation in Interstate Commerce, 9 VAND. L. REV. 138, 146-76
(1956).

19. 327 S.W.2d 305 (1959), 27 TENN.L.REV.308 (1960).
20. See U.S. BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMPENDIUM OF

STATE GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN 1958 1 (1959), showing that total state revenue
was materially less than aggregate state government expenditures in fiscal
1958.
21. TENN.CODE ANN. §§ 67-2701 to -2712 (1956).
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commerce clause since it did no local business. Over these objections,
the court sustained the tax. It was found applicable to taxpayer, and
valid as applied.
The Texas Gas decision is illustrative of the proposition that activities and events that are essential parts of an interstate operation
can be regarded as taxable local activity when the tax is challenged
on commerce clause grounds. 22 Also, this case once more shows
the importance of the role of astute statutory draftsmanship in resolving the commerce clause question. The particular verbalization
of a taxing statute often has more commerce clause significance than
the economic impact of the tax. 23 Thus, a tax statute phrased so as to
make the operative incidence of the tax a so-called "local activity or
event," although an integral part of interstate commerce, can often
get across the commerce clause hurdle, when a less felicitiously drawn
statute designed to reach essentially the same type of business operation will be struck down if the statute is so phrased that the tax is
regarded as an exaction on the privilege of engaging in interstate
commerce. 24 Not all taxes will be saved from commerce clause con22. A case that is almost on "all-fours" with the case at hand on the com-

merce clause question is Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80

(1948), which upheld a franchise tax upon the activities of "maintaining,
keeping in repair and otherwise in manning" pipe line facilities used in
transporting gas, although the business was exclusively interstate. Utah
Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932) sustained a tax on the
generation of electricity for out-of-state transmission, although the production and transmission processes were virtually simultaneous, with the
transmission being at a speed of approximately 186,000 miles per second.
Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604 (1938) sustained a tax for the privilege of operating engines used to propel gas
through interstate pipe lines.
23. As the late Professor Powell of Harvard once summed it up: "names
were made to matter more than mathematics or economics." Powell, More
Ado About Gross Receipts Taxes, 60 HARV. L. REv. 501, 503 (1947).
24. Thus, in Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948),
Mississippi was able to impose a privilege tax based on the capital which
taxpayer used in the state by simply making the subject of the tax the
activities of "maintaining, keeping in repair and otherwise in manning"
pipe line facilities used in transporting gas, although the business was
exclusively interstate transportation of gas. In Ozark Pipe Lines Corp. v.
Monier, 266 U.S. 555 (1925), the tax was phrased in more general terms as a
franchise tax for the privilege of doing business in the taxing state. Taxpayer engaged exclusively in interstate transportation of petroleum. Although
the Ozark Pipe Line taxpayer had connections with the taxing state that
were similar to, but more substantial than, the taxpayer in Memphis Natural
Gas, nevertheless the Ozark Pipe Line tax was invalidated as a levy on the
privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. The importance of the statutory
ritual in which the taxing statute is cast in determining the commerce
clause question has recently been demonstrated by the Supreme Court of
the United States in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,
358 U.S. 450 (1959), which sustained a tax levied directly upon net income
from exclusively interstate commerce. The importance of the statutory
formula is revealed by the Court's efforts to distinguish that case from
Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951), which had struck
down a tax imposed on a foreign corporation for the privilege of engaging in
exclusively interstate commerce, with the net income attributable to business done within the state being used as the measure of the tax. Spector was
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demnation, however, merely because they are cast in terms of bearing
upon some "local event,"25 and unfortunately there is no very trustworthy or workable standard to guide the lawmakers and tax
collectors in deciding when the activity has sufficient localism to
26
serve as the subject of a valid tax.

IV.

PRIVILEGE TAXES-VENDING MACHINE OPERATIONS-LIABILITY
TRANSFEREE FOR UNPAID PRIVILEGE TAXES OF TRANSFEROR

OF

The Tennessee Supreme Court case of Automatic Merchandising
Co. v. Atkins27 involved the recovery of a gross receipts privilege tax
paid to Tennessee under protest by complainant, Automatic Merchandising Co. of Memphis. The State's tax demand on complainant was
for unpaid taxes of the Chickasaw Canteen Co., which were allegedly
owed by complainant as the transferee of Chickasaw. The tax in
question was imposed for the privilege of engaging in the merchandise
vending machine business, in which both complainant and Chickasaw
engaged. The tax is made payable on August 1 for the fiscal year
beginning the preceding July 1, but, at the taxpayer's option, the
tax may be paid at a fixed time "on a quarterly installment basis." 28
The tax in dispute here was that which was allegedly owed by
Chickasaw for the last two quarters of fiscal 1956-57, and which
distinguished by the Northwestern Court solely on the ground that the
Spector tax was imposed "on" the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, with net income being used only as the measure of the tax, while
the validated Northwestern tax was levied "on" the net income derived solely
from interstate commerce.
25. Justice Rutledge expressed this idea effectively in Nippert v. City of
Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 423 (1946): "If the only thing necessary to sustain
a state tax bearing upon interstate commerce were to discover some local
incident which might be regarded as separate and distinct from 'the transportation or intercourse which is' the commerce itself and then to lay the
tax on that incident, all interstate commerce could be subjected to state
taxation and without regard to the substantial economic effects of the tax
upon the commerce. For the situation is difficult to think of in which
some incident of an interstate transaction taking place within a State could
not be segregated by an act of mental gymnastics and made the fulcrum of
the tax. All interstate commerce takes place within the confines of the
States and necessarily involves 'incidents' occurring within each State
through which it passes or with which it is connected in fact. And there is
no known limit to the human mind's capacity to carve out from what is
an entire or integral economic process particular phases or incidents, label
them as 'separate and distinct' or 'local' and thus achieve its desired result."
26. The occupation of broadcasting is a nontaxable activity. Fisher's
Blend Station, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 650 (1936). But the
generation of electricity, where the generation and interstate transmission
are simultaneous, is a taxable local event. Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost,
286 U.S. 165 (1932). Loading and unloading interstate commerce on ships is
a nontaxable activity. Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S.
422 (1947). However, the delivery of goods transported interstate by land
as a part of an interstate sale has been held a taxable, local event. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
27. 327 S.W.2d 328 (Tenn. 1959).
28. TENN. CODEANN. § 67-4318 (1956).
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Chickasaw did not pay. Chickasaw transferred its business as a going
concern to complainant through Automatic of Chicago on October
26, 1956. The state's claim against complainant was predicated on a
statute which provides that when a business is transferred during the
year in which quarterly payments are being made, the transferee
(complainant here) shall become liable for any quarterly installments that remain unpaid at the time of the transfer. 9 Complainant
operated the Chickasaw business during the two quarters in question.
Prior to, and after its acquisition of the Chickasaw business, complainant operated a vending machine business similar to that operated
by Chickasaw.
A. Effect of Proration
Complainant denied liability for the tax on several grounds, but was
nonetheless held liable for the tax. In the first place, complainant
resisted the tax on the ground that these installments for the last
two quarters were not owed by Chickasaw, because, when the tax is
proratable by quarters, it is payable only by a business which exercises the taxed privilege during at least part of the given quarter.
Chickasaw did not exercise the privilege during the third and fourth
quarters which are the periods for which the state is seeking to hold
complainant liable. In short, complainant argued that this is a
quarterly tax, rather than an annual tax. In rejecting this contention of complainant, the court pointed out that the statute provides that the taxpayer "shall have the option of paying his tax on a
quarterly installment basis," specifying the exact date when each
installment is due.30 The court likewise pointed out that the statutory
provision imposing the tax expressly declares that every person
31
operating a vending machine shall pay a specified tax "per annum."
From this evidence the court concluded that the tax was imposed
annually and not quarterly.
B. Statutory Meaning of "Transferee"
Complainant, in the Automatic case, likewise urged that it was not
liable for the tax because it was not a "transferee" within the meaning of the statute declaring that transferees should be liable for any
unpaid installments of taxes of the transferor. The court also rejected
this argument. While the actual nature of complainant's acquisition
of the business from Chickasaw is somewhat complicated, nevertheless it does appear that Complainant is a transferee from Chickasaw.
Chickasaw held an exclusive franchise for the vending machine

29. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4319 (1956).

30. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4318 (1956).
31. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 67-4203, item 65(c) (1956).

1266

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 13

business from Automatic Canteen of Chicago. Complainant, a Memphis firm, in September 1956, started negotiations with Automatic
of Chicago for the purpose of acquiring the Chickasaw business in
Memphis. Chickasaw transferred its business to Automatic of Chicago
October 26, 1956, apparently as part of the arrangement which complainant had with Automatic of Chicago. Automatic operated the
transferred business for a short time until arrangements with complainant were completed on November 8, 1956, at which time Automatic then turned over to complainant the profit it made on the
business during the closing of the deal from October 26 to November
8. Automatic of Chicago transferred to complainant essentially the
same business that Chickasaw turned over to Automatic, and for the
same consideration as that paid by Automatic to Chickasaw. Automatic, as part of the deal, refunded to Chickasaw the unearned portion
of the taxes which Chickasaw paid for the second quarter and charged
these taxes to complainant. Hence the court seems properly to have
concluded that for all practical purposes Automatic of Chicago was
only a conduit through which complainant acquired the business
from Chickasaw.
C. Problem of Double Taxation
The third ground on which complainant resisted the tax in the
Automatic case is that payment of this tax would result in double
taxation which is expressly forbidden by the statute that imposes the
tax. After the taxing statute provides that the transferee of a business shall be liable for any unpaid installments of taxes which the
transferor had elected to pay in quarterly installments, the statute
then goes on to declare that the transferee shall not be liable for
any further gross receipts taxes for the year in which the transfer
is made. 32 Moreover, the same statute further provides that it is the
legislative intent that only one (1) gross receipts tax shall be paid
on account of the operation of a business during any one (1) year.
Complainant, prior to, and after the acquisition of the Chickasaw
business, operated a vending machine business similar to the Chickasaw business. So, complainant took the position that it was exempt
from the unpaid Chickasaw tax since it had already paid a tax for
engaging in the vending machine business during the period in question. To hold complainant liable for the Chickasaw tax, complainant
argued, would violate the legislative mandate against double taxation.
In reversing the lower court, the Tennessee Supreme Court held
that the statute forbidding double taxation did not exempt complainant from the unpaid Chickasaw tax. The court concluded that
the prohibition was designed to make it clear that a transferee, who
32. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4319 (1956).
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was then, for the first time, being required to pay the unpaid taxes of
the transferor, should not be required also to pay on a monthly basis
for the remainder of the year. Although complainant had paid a tax
on the vending machine business it was operating at the time it
bought the Chickasaw vending machine business, nevertheless the
statutory prohibition against double taxation, said the Court, did not
exempt complainant from payment of the unpaid installments of
another like business, which it, as transferee, procured during the
year.
This facet of the Automatic decision does not appear completely
free from doubt. True enough, it can be urged with considerable
force that to permit complainant to escape this tax would have
permitted it to operate the Chickasaw business for the period tax
free. Moreover, complainant was the transferee of the Chickasaw
business and transferees are made liable for unpaid tax installments
of the transferor. On the other hand, the statute levying the tax
provides that "every person operating" a vending machine business
shall pay an annual tax of a specified amount per machine for each
fiscal year beginning July 1. 33 When complainant acquired the Chickasaw business did he become another person operating a vending
machine business? Was Complainant really operating another business after it acquired Chickasaw, or had it simply augmented its own
business, on which it had paid a tax, by buying Chickasaw? By holding that the transferee of a business acquired during the business
year must pay the unpaid installments of the transferor only when
the transferee had not been in the same kind of business before the
transfer is an interpretation of the statute contrary to that placed
on it by the court, but it would seem to be a permissible interpretation. This would give effect to the legislative mandate that "every
person" who engages in certain specified taxable business shall
be liable for only one gross receipts tax on account of the business
for any one year.
V. MUNICIPAL FRANCHISE TAXES-STEPS NECESSARY

To RECOVER AN

ILLEGAL TAX
The Tennessee Court of Appeals case, City of Memphis v. W.M.S.
Company,34 involved the question of steps that must be taken by a
taxpayer in order to recover from a municipality a tax that was
illegal. By a two to one vote the court reversed the lower court and
denied recovery of the tax on the ground that the tax was paid
voluntarily and not under duress.
The tax in question was one that taxpayer (a taxicab company) had
33. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4203, item 65(c) (1956).

34. 326 S.W.2d 828 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
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to pay to the city of Memphis as a condition precedent for the
privilege of operating taxis on the city streets. In 1956 the Memphis
ordinance imposing the tax was declared unconstitutional in a separate suit.35 In March, 1957 complainant (taxpayer) brought the
present suit to recover taxes paid for the years 1953, 1954 and 1955.
The opinion by the court discloses evidence that the questioned taxes
were paid under protest.
There is a statute authorizing the recovery of an illegal tax paid to
the state under protest; 36 but at the time the W.M.S. Company tax
case was started there was no similar statute authorizing the recovery
of an illegal municipal tax paid under protest. The Tennessee cases
seem to establish that an illegal municipal tax cannot be recovered
unless it is paid under protest, plus duress. 3 The majority of the
court in the W.M.S. Company case thought the tax was not paid
under duress.
Mr. Justice Avery would have allowed recovery of the taxes in
question, and he dissented on the ground that the tax was paid under
protest, as well as under duress. 38 He found the requisite duress in
the fact that not only would Memphis have revoked taxpayer's
franchise to operate a taxicab for failure to pay the tax; but, in
addition, taxpayer would have been subject to criminal sanctions for
operating taxicabs without the franchise. In short, the taxes had
to be paid, else taxpayer would have been denied his means of
39
making a livelihood.
Fortunately, the W.M.S. Company case is now of but litile significance in Tennessee. Effective July 1, 1959, a Tennessee statute
established a much more sensible procedure for recovering illegal
municipal taxes. All that is now necessary to do is to pay the tax
under protest.40 This is the same requirement as that applicable for
the recovery of illegal state taxes. The statute thus eliminates the
unnecessary and nebulous requirement of payment under duress for
the recovery of a municipal tax.
35. City of Memphis v. Yellow Cab, Inc., 201 Tenn. 71, 296 S.W.2d 864
(1956).
36. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-2302 through -2305 (1956).
37. See Atlas Powder Co. v. Goodloe, 131 Tenn. 490, 175 S.W. 547 (1914).
38. Memphis v. W.M.S. Co., 326 S.W.2d 828, 836 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
39. In Atlas Powder Co. v. Goodloe, 131 Tenn. 490, 175 S.W. 547 (1914), the
Tennessee court found the requisite duress where a corporation paid under
protest a tax as a condition precedent to the granting of permission to do
business in Tennessee. Although the tax was sustained on the merits, nevertheless the court said the heavy loss of business the corporation would
suffer if it did not pay the tax and get permission to do business, plus the
fact that the corporation would be violating the law by doing business
without getting the permission, amounted to payment under duress. Is not
that essentially the same double-edged sword of Damocles that hung over
the head of the taxpayer in the W.M.S. Co. case, and which Mr. Justice
Avery concluded was duress?
40. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2313 (1960 Supp.).

